Brzezinski Out Of Control Pdf

Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of America’s leading strategists, was national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter. His just published book is “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power.” He spoke on Friday with Global Viewpoint Network editor Nathan Gardels.

Full text of 'BETWEEN TWO AGESAmerica's Role in the Technetronic EraZbigniew BrzezinskiTHE VIKING PRESS / NEW YORKCopyright © 1 970 by Zbigniew Brzezinski All rights reservedFirst published in 1970 by The Viking Press, Inc. 625 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022Published simultaneously in Canada by The Macmillan Company of Canada LimitedISBN 670-16041-5Library of Congress catalog card number: 76-104162Printed in U.S.Aby H. Wolff Book Mfg.

Co.Prepared under the auspices of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia UniversityPortions of this book appeared in Encounter in different form- 1 -For Ian, Mark, and MikaAcknowledgmentsThough this book deals with communism only in part — and then primarily in relation to the broader issues with which I amconcerned — the Research Institute on Communist Affairs of Columbia University provided me with invaluable researchassistance and with a congenial and stimulating setting. My colleagues at the Institute little realize how very helpful theyhave been in the gradual process of shaping my ideas, testing my views, and enlarging my perspectives. The manuscript wasread and criticized by a number of friends and colleagues. I am especially grateful to Professor Samuel P. Huntington for histrenchant criticisms and very helpful recommendations; to Professor Albert A. Mavrinac, who maintained our friendly tradi-tion of his questioning my arguments and of forcing me to rethink some of my propositions; to Mrs. Christine Dodson, theformer Administrative Assistant of the Research Institute, who prepared a very constructive and highly perceptive chapter-length critique of the entire draft; and to Professor Alexander Erlich for steering me away from some economic pitfalls.

I amalso most obliged and grateful to Miss Sophia Sluzar, currently the Administrative Assistant, who very ably supervised theover-all preparation of the manuscript and who earlier was instrumental in preparing the tables and assembling the neededdata. Miss Toby Trister, my research assistant, was indefatigable in exposing my inaccuracies, in filling bibliographic gaps,and in completing the research. Miss Dorothy Rodnite, Miss Michelle Elwyn, and Mr. Myron Gutmann amiably andefficiently — even when under great pressures of time — devoted their energies to the completion of the manuscript.

To all ofthem I owe a debt which I am pleased to acknowledge.I also wish to note my obligation to Mr. Marshall Best of The Viking Press, on whose experience and wise counsel I oftenrelied, and to Mr. Stanley Hochman for his sensitive editorial assistance.A special mention is due to my wife.

In all my writing I have never come across a more conscientious reader, a moreferocious critic, and a more determined — dare I say obstinate? — perfectionist. I have no hesitation in saying, though onlynow I say it with relief, that any merit this essay may have is in large measure due to her efforts.Z.B. October 1969- 2 -ContentsCONTENTS 3THE GLOBAL IMPACT OF THE 8TECHNETRONIC REVOLUTION 81. The Onset of the Technetronic Age 10New Social Patterns 10Social Explosion/Implosion 11Global Absorption 132.

The Ambivalent Disseminator 15The American Impact 75New Imperialism? Global Ghettos 19Prospects for Change 20The Subjective Transformation 21The Political Vacuum 254. Global Fragmentation and Unification 26Fragmented Congestion 26Toward a Planetary Consciousness 28THE AGE OF VOLATILE BELIEF 311.

The Quest for a Universal Vision 31The Universal Religions 32The National Identity 33Ideological Universalism 342. Turbulence within Institutionalized Beliefs 35Institutional Marxism 35Organized Christianity 38Privatization of Belief. Histrionics as History in Transition 41Escape from Reason 42The Political Dimension 43Historical Discontinuity 454. Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology 47The Quest for Equality 47Syncretic Belief. 48COMMUNISM: THE PROBLEM OF RELEVANCE 521.

The Stalinist Paradox 52The Necessity of Stalinism 53Imperial Pacification 552. The Bureaucratization of Boredom 57The Innovative Relationship 57Defensive Orthodoxy 58Perspective on Tomorrow 613.

The Soviet Future 62Internal Dilemmas 62Alternative Paths 66The Problem of Vitality 694. Sectarian Communism 70Phases 70Assimilated Communisms 71China and Global Revolution 73THE AMERICAN TRANSITION 771. The Third American Revolution 78The Pace and Thrust of Progress 79The Uncertainty of Progress 81- 3 -The Futility of Politics 832. The New Left Reaction 86Infantile Ideology 86Revolutionaries in Search of Revolution 88The Historic Function of the Militant Left 903. The Crisis of Liberalism 91The Liberal Janus 92The Price of Victorious Skepticism 92The End of Liberal Democracy? 95AMERICA AND THE WORLD 981. The American Future 98Participatory Pluralism 99Change in Cultural Formation 101Rational Humanism 1032.

International Prospects 104The Revolutionary Process 105USA/USSR: Less Intensive, More Extensive Rivalry 707Policy Implications 1083. A Community of the Developed Nations IllWestern Europe and Japan IllStructure and Focus 112The Communist States 113Risks and Advantages 114REFERENCE NOTES 117INDEX 123- 4 -IntroductionPerhaps the time is past for the comprehensive 'grand' vision. In some ways, it was a necessarysubstitute for ignorance, a compensation in breadth for the lack of depth in man's understanding of his world. Buteven if this is so, the result of more knowledge maybe greater ignorance — or, at least, the feeling of ignorance —about where we are and where we are heading, and particularly where we should head, than was true when infact we knew less but thought we knew more.I am not sure that this need be so. In any case, I am not satisfied with the fragmented, microscopicunderstanding of the parts, and I feel the need for some — even if crude — approximation of a larger perspective.This book is an effort to provide such a perspective. It is an attempt to define the meaning — within a dynamicframework — of a major aspect of our contemporary reality: the emerging global political process whichincreasingly blurs the traditional distinctions between domestic and international politics. In working toward thatdefinition, I shall focus particularly on the meaning for the United States of the emergence of this process,seeking to draw implications from an examination of the forces that are molding it.Time and space shape our perception of reality.

The specific moment and the particular setting dictatethe way international estimates and priorities are defined. Sometimes, when the moment is historically 'ripe,' thesetting and the time may coalesce to provide a special insight. A perceptive formula is easier to articulate in amoment of special stress. Conditions of war, crisis, tension are in that sense particularly fertile.

The situation ofcrisis permitssharper value judgments, in keeping with man's ancient proclivity for dividing his reality into goodand evil. (Marxist dialectic is clearly in this tradition, and it infuses moral dichotomy into every assessment.) Butshort of that critical condition — which in its most extreme form involves the alternatives of war or peace —global politics do not lend themselves to pat formulations and clear-cut predictions, even in a setting of extensivechange.

As a result — in most times — it is extraordinarily difficult to liberate oneself from the confining influenceof the immediate and to perceive — from a detached perspective — the broader sweep of events.Any abstract attempt to arrive at a capsule formula is bound to contain a measure of distortion. Theinfluences that condition relations among states and the broad evolution of international affairs are too various.Nonetheless, as long as we are aware that any such formulation inescapably contains a germ of falsehood — andhence must be tentative — the attempt represents an advance toward at least a partial understanding.

Thealternative is capitulation to complexity: the admission that no sense can be extracted from what is happening.The consequent triumph of ignorance exacts its own tribute in the form of unstable and reactive policies, thesubstitution of slogans for thought, the rigid adherence to generalized formulas made in another age and inresponse to circumstances that are different in essence from our own, even if superficially similar.Today, the most industrially advanced countries (in the first instance, the United States) are beginningto emerge from the industrial stage of their development. They are entering an age in which technology andespecially electronics — hence my neologism 'technetronic'.

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— are increasingly becoming the principaldeterminants of social change, altering the mores, the social structure, the values, and the global outlook ofsociety. And precisely because today change is so rapid and so complex, it is perhaps more important than everbefore that our conduct of foreign affairs be guided by a sense of history — and to speak of history in thiscontext is to speak simultaneously of the past and of the future.Since it focuses on international affairs, this book is at most only a very partial response to the need fora more comprehensive assessment. It is not an attempt to sum up the human condition, to combine philosophyand science, to provide answers to more perplexing questions concerning our reality. It is much more modestthan that, and yet I am uneasily aware that it is already much too ambitious, because it unavoidably touches onall these issues.The book is divided into five major parts. The first deals with the impact of the scientific-technologicalrevolution on world affairs in general, discussing more specifically the ambiguous position of the principaldisseminator of that revolution — the United States — and analyzing the effects of the revolution on the so-calledThird World. The second part examines how the foregoing considerations have affected the content, style, andformat of man's political outlook on his global reality, with particular reference to the changing role of ideology.The third part assesses the contemporary relevance of communism to problems of modernity, looking first at theexperience of the Soviet Union and then examining the over-all condition of international communism as amovement that once sought to combine internationalism and humanism. The fourth part focuses on the UnitedStates, a society that is both a social pioneer and a guinea pig for mankind; it seeks to define the thrust of changeand the historical meaning of the current American transition.

The fifth part outlines in very broad terms thegeneral directions that America might take in order to make an effective response to the previously discussedforeign and domestic dilemmas.Having said what the book does attempt, it might be helpful to the reader also to indicate what it doesnot attempt. First of all, it is not an exercise in 'futurology'; it is an effort to make sense of present trends, todevelop a dynamic perspective on what is happening. Secondly, it is not a policy book, in the sense that its objectis not to develop systematically a coherent series of prescriptions and programs.

In Part V, however, it does tryto indicate the general directions toward which America should and, in some respects, may head.In the course of developing these theses, I have expanded on some of the ideas initially advanced in myarticle 'America in the Technetronic Age,' published in Encounter, January 1968, which gave rise toconsiderable controversy. I should add that not only have I tried to amplify and clarify some of the rather- 5 -condensed points made in that article, but I have significantly revised some of my views in the light ofconstructive criticisms made by my colleagues. Moreover, that article addressed itself to only one aspect(discussed primarily in Part I) of the much larger canvas that I have tried to paint in this volume.It is my hope that this essay will help to provide the reader with a better grasp of the nature of thepolitical world we live in, of the forces shaping it, of the directions it is pursuing. In that sense, it might perhapscontribute to a sharper perception of the new political processes enveloping our world and move beyond themore traditional forms of examining international politics. I hope, too, that the tentative propositions, thegeneralizations, and the theses advanced here — though necessarily speculative, arbitrary, and in very manyrespects inescapably inadequate — may contribute to the increasing discussion of America's role in the world.In the course of the work, I have expressed my own opinions and exposed my prejudices. This effort is,therefore, more in the nature of a 'think piece,' backed by evidence, than of a systematic exercise in social-science methodology.Finally, let me end this introduction with a confession that somewhat anticipates my argument: anapocalyptic-minded reader may find my thesis uncongenial because my view of America's role in the world isstill an optimistic one. I say 'still' because I am greatly troubled by the dilemmas we face at home and abroad,and even more so by the social and philosophical implications of the direction of change in our time.Nonetheless, my optimism is real.

Although I do not mean to minimize the gravity of America'sproblems — their catalogue is long, the dilemmas are acute, and the signs of a meaningful response are at mostambivalent — I truly believe that this society has the capacity, the talent, the wealth, and, increasingly, the will tosurmount the difficulties inherent in this current historic transition.In this respect, I share the view of Barrington Moore, Jr., that 'when we set the dominant body of current thinking against important figuresin the nineteenth century, the following differences emerge. First of all, the critical spirit has all but disappeared. Second, modern sociology,and perhaps to a lesser extent also modern political science, economics, and psychology, are ahistorical.

Third, modern social science tendsto be abstract and formal. In research, social science today displays considerable technical virtuosity.

But this virtuosity has been gained atthe expense of content. Modern sociology has less to say about society than it did fifty years ago' (Political Power and Social Theory,Cambridge, Mass., 1958, p. 123).- 6 -BETWEEN TWO AGES'Human life is reduced to real suffering, to hell, only when two ages, two cultures and religions overlap.There are times when a whole generation is caught in this way between two ages, two modes of life, with theconsequence that it loses all power to understand itself and has no standard, no security, no simpleacquiescence.'

— Hermann Hesse, Steppenwolf- 7 -PARTIThe Global Impact of theTechnetronic RevolutionThe paradox of our time is that humanity is becoming simultaneously more unified and morefragmented. That is the principal thrust of contemporary change. Time and space have become so compressedthat global politics manifest a tendency toward larger, more interwoven forms of cooperation as well as towardthe dissolution of established institutional and ideological loyalties.

Humanity is becoming more integral andintimate even as the differences in the condition of the separate societies are widening. Under thesecircumstances proximity, instead of promoting unity, gives rise to tensions prompted by a new sense of globalcongestion.A new pattern of international politics is emerging. The world is ceasing to be an arena in whichrelatively self-contained, 'sovereign,' and homogeneous nations interact, collaborate, clash, or make war.International politics, in the original sense of the term, were born when groups of people began to identifythemselves — and others — in mutually exclusive terms (territory, language, symbols, beliefs), and when thatidentification became in turn the dominant factor in relations between these groups. The concept of nationalinterest — based on geographical factors, traditional animosities or friendships, economics, and security consid-erations — implied a degree of autonomy and specificity that was possible only so long as nations weresufficiently separated in time and space to have both the room to maneuver and the distance needed to maintainseparate identity.During the classical era of international politics, weapons, communications, economics, and ideologywere all essentially national in scope. With the invention of modern artillery, weaponry required nationalarsenals and standing armies; in more recent times it could be effectively and rapidly deployed by one nationagainst the frontiers of another. Communications, especially since the invention of the steam engine and theresulting age of railroads, reinforced national integration by making it possible to move people and goods acrossmost nations in a period of time rarely exceeding two days. National economies, frequently resting on autarkicprinciples, stimulated both the awareness and the development of collective vested interest, protected by tariffwalls.

Nationalism so personalized community feelings that the nation became an extension of the ego.All four factors mentioned above are now becoming global. Weapons of total destructive power can beapplied at any point on the globe in a matter of minutes — in less time, in fact, than it takes for the police in amajor city to respond to an emergency call.

The entire globe is in closer reach and touch than a middle-sizedEuropean power was to its own capital fifty years ago. Transnational ties are gaining in importance, while theclaims of nationalism, though still intense, are nonetheless becoming diluted.

This change, naturally, has gonefurthest in the most advanced countries, but no country is now immune to it. The consequence is a new era — anera of the global political process.Yet though the process is global, real unity of mankind remains remote.

The contemporary world isundergoing a change in many respects similar to that prompted by the earlier appearance of large populationcenters. The growth of such centers weakened intimate and direct lines of authority and contributed to theappearance of many conflicting and crosscutting allegiances.

Brzezinski provides a stark and realistic look at the world's economy and moral crisis in a brilliant analysis of today's geopolitical order.If America is to reassert its moral legitimacy, Brzezinski argues, it must address its basic dilemmas, including deepening poverty, inadequate health care and education, a greedy wealthy class opposed to progressive taxation, and the mass media's promotion of sex and violence. In the new world of rival global power clusters, Brzezinski urges a greater role for the United Nations and 'redistribution of responsibilities' within the trilateral nexus of Europe, America and East Asia ( Publisher’s Weekly).